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无限论文:Business Environment

无限论文:商业环境分析

  Business Environment

  And Strategic

  Management:

  STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

  OF NOKIA GROUP

  Word Count: 3,297

  Table of Contents

  1. INTRODUCTION: .......................................................................................................3

  1.1 Company Background..............................................................................................3

  1.2 Mobile Phone Industry.............................................................................................3

  1.3 Western European Market.......................................................................................4

  2. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING

  THE INDUSTRY:................................................................................................................6

  2.1 Macro-Environment:PESTEL Analysis...................................................................6

  2.2 Micro-Environment: Five Forces Analysis..............................................................7

  3. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANY’S STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AS AT

  JANUARY 2011:..................................................................................................................8

  3.1 Value Chain Analysis...............................................................................................8

  3.2 Resource Based View Analysis................................................................................9

  3.3 Dynamic Capabilities Analysis..............................................................................10

  3.4 Core Competencies................................................................................................11

  4. KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES FACING NOKIA IN JANUARY 2011 ....................12

  5. EVALUATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP WITH MICROSOFT ANNOUNCED

  IN FEBRUARY 2011:........................................................................................................13

  5.1 Strategic Logic.......................................................................................................13

  5.3 Strategic Evaluation...............................................................................................13

  5.3 Alternative Strategies/Method of Development....................................................14

  6. CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN NOKIA..................................................................17

  7. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................19

  8. REFERENCES...........................................................................................................18

  APPENDICES:

  Appendix One: PESTEL Analysis

  Appendix Two: Five Forces Analysis

  Appendix Three: Value Chain Analysis

  Appendix Four: Resource Based View Analysis

  Appendix Five: SWOT Analysis

  2

  1. INTRODUCTION:

  1.1 Company Background

  Nokia Corporation was established in 1967, and is a leading global mobile devices and

  network equipment manufacturer; with products and services spanning basic and high end

  mobile devices, telecom network equipment and related services, and software and services.

  Nokia generates revenues through three business operating divisions: devices and services

  (68% of the total revenues in FY2010), Nokia Siemens Networks (30%), and NAVTEQ

  (2%).

  Despite being the largest mobile device manufacturer, Nokia’s financial performance is under

  pressure. In the first quarter of the Financial Year 2011, the company reported net sales of

  EUR 10.4 billion, a 9% increase as compared to 2010 (EUR 9.5 billion) but decrease of 18%

  sequentially; and an operating profit of EUR 439 million, a decrease of 10% as compared to

  2010 (EUR 488 million) and 50% sequentially (Nokia, 2011; Datamonitor, 2010). This

  reduced financial performance is mainly due to Nokia’s inability to penetrate the high-end

  Smartphone market (Arthur, 2011d).

  A strategic business unit (SBU) is a part of an organisation for which there is a distinct

  external market for goods or services that is different from another SBU (Johnson et al,

  2008). The Nokia SBU this management report will focus upon is the Mobile Devices

  Division, with particular emphasis upon the lucrative fast-growing Smartphone segment.

  1.2 Mobile Phone Industry

  The mobile phone industry ‘consists of all analog and digital handsets used for mobile

  telephony. It includes the manufacture, operation and distribution of mobile phones and any

  additional services that are directly facilitated by mobile telecommunications’ (Datamonitor,

  2011). In 2011, the overall industry mobile device volumes is estimated to be 374 million

  units, representing an increase of 16% compared to 2010. Nokia’s market share was 29% in

  the first quarter 2011, down from an estimated 31% in the fourth quarter 2010 (Euromonitor

  International, 2011; Nokia, 2011).

  3

  Smartphones are mobile phones offering advanced capabilities, often with PC-like

  functionality. For Nokia, Smartphones represented over 50% of the company’s devices and

  services net sales. However, Nokia’s preliminary estimated share of this market fell to 26% in

  the first quarter 2011, compared with an estimated 41% in the first quarter 2010 (Nokia,

  2011). The Smartphone industry is undergoing rapid growth as rates of adoption increase

  amongst consumers. It is forecast to grow at a compounded annual rate of 32% between

  2010 and 2014, with Smartphones expected to represent 26% of all mobile handsets by 2014

  (Euromonitor, 2011).

  This industry is mostly dominated by a few well established corporations such as Nokia,

  Samsung, Apple Inc, Motorola and LG (see Figure 1). However Nokia’s main competitor in

  the Smartphone Industry is Apple, who attracts more than 50% of the profits (The Economist,

  2011).

  Figure 1: Market

  Shares % and Share

  of Profits % for

  Main Mobile

  Phone

  Manufacturers

  (source: The

  Economist, 2011)

  1.3 Western Europe Market

  This report will focus upon the Western European Market, which is Nokia’s largest growing

  target developed market by net sales (see Figure 2). In 2014, the European mobile phones

  market is forecast to have a value of $33,436.7 million, an increase of 30% since 2009; and

  volume of 308.9 million units, an increase of 18.4% since 2009 (Euromonitor International,

  2011).

  4

  Figure 2: Nokia’s Net Sales by

  Market 2010 (source: Nokia,

  2011)

  2.

  ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

  AFFECTING THE INDUSTRY:

  Because of the fast pace of the industry, this report will focus its recommendations and

  predictions for the period 2011-2014.

  2.1 Macro-Environment: PESTEL Analysis

  Appendix 1: Pestle Analysis

  PESTEL is the traditional analytical tool used when scanning the macro-environment. It

  categorises the environmental influences into six main types: political, economic, social,

  technological, environmental and legal (Johnson et al, 2008; Walsh, 2005). However Burt et

  al (2006) and Thakur (2010) argue the taxonomic classifications of PESTEL are of limited

  use, because they are: too generic, fail to emphasis the interrelationships and

  interdependences among variables, and do not produce a clear understanding of the

  (potential) external drivers of change. Personally I feel the framework is also enshrouded

  with uncertainty, as the future can never be predicted for certain, which some may say defeats

  the purpose of the exercise. There are alternative frameworks, such as scenario planning and

  SPENT (Campbell, 2002).

  The governing environmental factor influencing the Smartphone industry is technology, with

  software and data service advances correlating with temporary competitive advantages. The

  next level of advancement relates to cloud computing and 4G, which present both an

  opportunity and threat to Smartphone manufacturers (Euromonitor, 2010c).

  Currently, the main value driver for manufacturers has been operating systems within an

  ecosystem of applications and services to drive revenue. However, cloud computing has the

  potential to move application processing and data storage to virtual locations with browser-

  based user interfaces, thereby making the operating system of mobile computers largely

  irrelevant for consumers.

  The expansion of mobile communications into increased video and data content will facilitate

  the expansion of 4G technology over the forecast period as mobile data traffic will continue

  6

  increasing. 4G technologies are also crucial to making cloud computing on mobile devices

  viable. With America already developing 4G data networks, it is predicted 4G and cloud

  computing will replace operating systems in Western Europe by 2013. Therefore capturing

  the 4G market early is key to long-term success particularly in the high-end Smartphone

  segment (Euromonitor International, 2010b).

  2.2 Micro-Environment Analysis: Five Forces Framework

  Appendix 2 Five Forces Analysis.

  The Five Forces Framework was devised by M.Porter in 1979 to assess the attractiveness and

  profitability of an industry, by identifying possible sources of competitive pressure (Jeff,

  2010; Johnson et al, 2008; Porter, 1998).

  However, the framework has limited practical use because it oversimplifies an industry and

  assumes relatively static markets. Furthermore because it is based originally on the economic

  situation of the eighties it can be found to be out of date with new business models and the

  dynamism of technological industries (Coyne, 1996, Kippenberger, 1998; Grundy, 2006).

  Personally, I find that the framework over-emphasises the importance of profitability, without

  taking into serious consideration wider influences. Because of these limitations, the

  Framework should be used in conjunction with other analytical tools such as PESTEL,

  Growth Drivers and Porter’s strategic group analysis (Jeffs, 2010).

  Porter’s 5 Forces Framework indicates that the competitive environment surrounding the

  Smartphone industry is relatively moderate and so it is a profitable growing industry.

  Increasing competitive rivalry poses the main threat to profitability. The industry is attracting

  entrants from other industries, aswell as Asian manufacturers targeting the lower-end of the

  market (Wray, 2010; Passport, 2010).

  7

  3.

  ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANY’S STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AS AT

  JANUARY 2011

  3.1 Value Chain Analysis

  Appendix 3: Nokia’s Value Chain

  The Value Chain is an analytical model devised by M.Porter in1985. It systematically

  highlights which activities within and around an organisation deliver value, and thus

  contribute to a company’s strategic capabilities (Porter, 1985).

  The framework has attracted criticism in that originally it was a descriptive tool to aid

  external environmental scanning (rather than internal) and that its application is limited to

  manufacturing firms rather than service firms (Kippenberger, 1997). Furthermore the

  framework was developed within a different business environment, today many companies

  outsource their primary activities, and form strategic alliances and partnerships with other

  firms. Therefore the value chain ceases to exist in Porters ‘physical intra-firm’ context

  (Peppard and Rylander, 2006). This is particularly true for mobile phone manufacturers

  where the ‘value chain is increasingly evolving into a value network consisting a series of

  inter-twined value chains with multiple entry and exit points’ (Li and Whalley, 2002,

  pp453).These criticisms indicate the framework’s out datedness. Lastly, the framework

  appears to be theoretical in that it fails to emphasise that it is customers and end-users who

  truly dictate what value is (Svensson, 2003; Rainbird, 2004). Personally, I find the

  segmentation of primary activities to be futile, as it is difficult to compartmentalise a 21st

  century company’s activities.

  Alternative Frameworks include the Network Value Analysis, Added Value Chain and the

  Resource Based View, which take into account current business realities and challenges

  (McPhee and Wheeler, 2006).

  Overall, Nokia has a relatively strong integrated value chain. Its large outbound logistics

  network coupled with its marketing and sales division particularly represent core strengths of

  8

  the company. Together these activities have ensured substantial volumes of sales across the

  world.

  However the analysis has identified two potential areas that may develop into blockages (and

  thus weaknesses). Although the global operations infrastructure contributes to Nokia’s

  benefits associated with economies of scale, such infrastructure is expensive to maintain.

  Additionally, Nokia has several inter-competing research and development teams, which lack

  focus or direction. This stifles innovative product development. These teams need to be

  consolidated with particular emphasis attached to coordination. Furthermore the Ovi

  Services segment of the SBU is failing to generate wealth, due to its unpopularity among

  developers and end-users.

  3.2 Resource Based View (RBV)

  Appendix 4: Analysis of Nokia’s Resources

  Barney (1991) developed RBV, an analytic model based upon the idea that competitive

  advantage is derived from the distinctiveness of a company’s resources and competencies

  (Fahy, 2000; Powell et al, 2006). However, personally I find this model of very limited use.

  The criteria (VRIO) by which resources are found to be unique are: context in-sensitive

  (Brush and Artz, 1999), subject to wide interpretations, exogenous to the model, tautological

  (Priem and Butler, 2001) and repetitive (I find each of the criteria basically the same). I also

  find the logic surrounding the model paradoxical. Furthermore, no practical guidance is

  offered as to how valuable resources achieve sustainable competitive advantage.

  Additionally, it is questionable as to whether the model is subject to empirical validity (Ray

  et al, 2003). Especially since many intangible resources are difficult to measure. The model

  is also based upon the notion of sustainable competitive advantage, which some describe as a

  myth, ideological and temporary in nature (Lynch and Baines, 2004; Powell, 2001).

  Furthermore, I would argue in today’s environment competitive survival is more important.

  9

  Lastly, the model is reliant upon equilibrium and fails to take into account the high velocity

  of business environment change (Bogner et al, 1999; Lockett and Thompson, 2001).

  Therefore the dynamic capabilities view maybe a more appropriate alternative to RBV.

  In relation to Nokia, the company has many threshold resources, but surprisingly very few

  unique intangible resources that can contribute to the firm’s competitive advantage. The main

  intangible resource Nokia has at its disposable that can help it neutralise threats and exploit

  opportunities lies within its strong corporate brand and reputation. However the RBV

  analysis highlighted that the firm’s culture, which is generally viewed as a strong unique

  intangible resource (Barney, 1991) is unfortunately in need of change. This supports the

  findings of the value chain.

  3.3 Dynamic Capabilities View (DCV)

  Dynamic Capabilities is a relatively new view of strategic capability, which encompasses ‘the

  ability of [an] organisation to develop, apply and monitor constant alignment or re-launching

  of processes associated with adaption or creation’ of new resource configurations in rapidly

  changing environments (Teece, 1997, pp517). However, like other frameworks DCV is very

  abstract (Winter, 2003) and research industry specific, there is no unifying framework on

  how the DCV is to be applied or how capabilities are to be measured practically (Simonin,

  1999; Zahra et al, 2006; Pavlou and Sawy, 2011) and neither is there consensus regarding the

  terminology the view uses (Williamson, 1999; Arend and Bromiley, 2009). There is also the

  limitation that in order to highlight dynamic capabilities, a researcher needs full access to

  Nokia’s internal routines and processes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), even so Grant (1996)

  argues dynamic capabilities may even be ‘invisible’ for managers to recognise.

  Nokia’s main dynamic capability is related to the company’s past growth strategy based on

  diverse acquisitions. Through acquisitions Nokia is able to learn new skills and exploit

  synergies which in turn help it to re-evaluate its resource configurations with changing

  market demands (Pontiskoski and Asakawa, 2009). An example of this is the 2010

  acquisition of Motally Inc which helped Nokia gain new skills and knowledge in regards to

  its OviStore Services (Nokia, 2011).

  10

  Nokia has no core dynamic capability especially in relation to product development, which

  may explain why it is playing catch-up with Smartphone competitors. But dynamic

  capabilities are difficult to sustain in high-velocity industries (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).

  3.4 Core Competencies

  Core competencies are the integration and coordination of corporate level resources across a

  corporation that enable the firm to offer, make, deliver a unique product/service which

  provide access to a wide variety of markets and cannot be imitated (Prahalad and Hamel,

  1990). This model cannot be applied as only one SBU has been analysed.

  In summary, the internal analysis of Nokia has highlighted very few strategic capabilities in

  relation to the Smartphone industry.

  11

  4. KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES FACING NOKIA IN JANUARY 2011

  The SWOT (Appendix 5) highlights three key issues influencing Nokia’s future competitive

  survival:

  How can management adopt/develop an operating system that will support a better

  OVI service, attract developers and satisfy end-users’ needs in the immediate future?

  How will Nokia technologically differentiate its next Smartphone model which looks

  past the ‘iphone’ and takes Smartphones onto a whole new level (namely cloud

  computing, 4G data network and in-home content integration)?

  How can Nokia use its strengths to exploit the elderly Smartphone market?

  These issues are orientated around the increasing threat competitive rivalry poses for the

  company, and how it can stay ahead of industry trends by differentiating its products and

  services, whilst increasing profitability.

  12

  5.

  EVALUATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP WITH MICROSOFT

  ANNOUNCED IN FEBRUARY 2011

  5.1 Strategic Logic

  The strategic logic behind the Nokia and Microsoft Partnership is simple: product

  development. Nokia, as highlighted by this report, does not have the operating system (OS)

  software capabilities needed to survive in the Smartphone market and therefore needs to gain

  those capabilities externally. The answer (according to Nokia’s CEO) is Microsoft’s

  Windows OS platform. This means Nokia’s own Symbian OS will be phased out and its

  OVIStore integrated within Microsoft’s service ecosystem. The deal also means that a

  significant proportion of Nokia’s research and development team will be made redundant as

  the need for in-house software development subdues (Arthur, 2011c). Therefore the

  Partnership will result in reduced costs and attainment of software resources.

  5.2 Strategy Evaluation

  Suitability:

  The Partnership does not deal with all the key issues identified in this report. Firstly, although

  Microsoft’s OS is more consumer friendly compared to Nokia’s Symbian, it does not have a

  strong record in content and applications, a core weakness of Nokia also (O’Reilly, 2011).

  Windows Phone 7 ecosystem supports a mere 8,000 apps (as compared to Apple’s 330,000),

  which developers do not find attractive (Rivlin, 2011). Therefore the Partnership will not

  solve Nokia’s poor app service, without which Nokia does not have a reason for consumers to

  buy their platform over Apples/RIM.

  Secondly, Microsoft’s Windows Phone has not proved popular among consumers, indicating

  its lack of consumer understanding and appeal. Thirdly, the sidelining of Nokia’s internal

  software capabilities, means the firm is effectively now dependent upon Microsoft and the

  success of the Partnership. It has lost proprietary control of its smartphone’s main

  component-software. Fourthly, it is going to take time for the Partnership to become

  established and ‘Windokia’ smartphone to become available; but in a fast-moving industry,

  13

  time is something no player can afford. There is also the risk of asset appropriation-that

  Nokia will lose some of its ‘trade secrets’ to a competitor.

  Lastly, the Partnership does not put Nokia ahead of the industry or offer competitive

  advantage, it only offers threshold resources and thus survival. Because Windows OS is not

  technologically evolutionary, Nokia will still be playing ‘catch-up’ (Ward, 2011).

  Feasibility:

  The only main barrier to the partnership implementation is whether the two firm’s resources

  and capabilities complement each other in synergy. On paper it seems so. Nokia is the

  world’s largest mobile phone manufacturer with its main strength lying within hardware

  design and production. Whilst Microsoft is the world’s most profitable software

  manufacturer. The strategic fit will also be reinforced by the fact Elop is a former employee

  of Microsoft and therefore there should be no management clashes.

  Acceptability:

  The main stakeholder to have revolted against the Partnership is Nokia’s own employees. The

  news of redundancies and abandonment of internal OS’s has aggravated Nokia’s already

  divided culture. Resulting in some employees and developers ‘jumping ship’ (Moen, 2011).

  Furthermore as indicated above, the deal has not generated excitement among consumers

  who see the Windows OS fairly ordinary. Conversely Nokia shareholders seem to be

  relatively content with the deal, however this is probably due to the reported billions

  Microsoft paid to cement the partnership.

  Overall the Partnership does not deal with the key issues identified in this report, neither does

  it seem acceptable to some of Nokia’s stakeholders. These problems could prevent the

  partnership from succeeding.

  5.3 Alternative Strategy/Method of Development

  Table 1 describes alternative strategies Nokia could implement simultaneously to deal with

  the key issues identified by this report:

  14

  Action Development

  Strategy (Ansoff)

  Competitive Strategy

  (Porter)

  Method of

  Development

  Benefits Short/Relative

  Long Term

  Adopt the Product Development Because the OS is free-Strategic Partnership Google’s Android OS is a better strategic partner than Microsoft: as Short-Term

  Android OS for Cost Focus with Google it’s the world’s most popular OS, open-source and therefore tailor-able,

  immediate and most important of all it appeals to developers and consumers. The

  Smartphone Android OS supports an App service of 200,000+ third-party apps

  models to (Chan, 2010), and as the internal analysis highlighted Nokia is in dire

  improve Service need of a service platform that its end-users and developers approve of.

  Target Western Market Development Focus Differentiation Strategic Partnership The Google OS could be integrated within a basic yet efficient Nokia Short-Term

  European Elderly with Google Smartphone model targeted directly at the elderly market (exploiting

  Market Nokia’s marketing and outbound-logistic strengths). This market is not

  saturated, with few competitors and thus may prove to be a lucrative

  opportunity.

  Develop MeeGo

  OS

  Product Development Differentiation Strategic Partnership

  with Intel

  It is important that if Nokia want to regain their position as leaders of

  the industry that they take Smartphones to the next evolutionary level.

  Nokia can achieve this by simultaneously coordinating its resources

  and attention upon its in-progress Linux-based MeeGo OS. Which is

  Relative Long-

  Term (within

  next 2 years)

  supported by the strategic partnership with Intel. MeeGo OS is far

  more technically superior than that of Apple’s iOS or RIM (Arthur,

  2010b) and able to support 4G/Cloud Computing etc, should therefore

  help Nokia differentiate its future Smartphones from competitors.

  These strategies meet all the key issues identified by this report, and are more suitable and

  acceptable than that of the Microsoft Partnership.

  6. CHANGE MANAGEMENT IN NOKIA

  Many academics associate strategic change and development to leadership. Leaders can be

  seen as symbols, personification, and communicators of change. It is their vision that can

  determine and dictate strategy (Kotter, 2001; Waldman et al, 2001). Yet in practice managers

  base their strategic decisions upon culture, politics, instinct, gut feelings and routines

  (emergent strategy) rather than a rational analytic approach (deliberate strategy). Managers

  develop strategy in practice based on a limited set of data subjectively interpreted. Business

  reality is always in a state of complex flux and unpredictable, and therefore rational analysis

  may not be always feasible (Ludwig, 2011).

  Stephen Elop (former President of Microsoft Business Division) became Nokia’s first non-

  Finn CEO as of September 21, 2010. His decisions so far (Partnership with Microsoft,

  consolidation of R&D and personnel and costs reduction) indicate Elop is introducing a

  reconstruction strategic change (Orlowski, 2011). Although the decisions do involve rapid

  change, upheaval and realignment of its strategy with environmental changes, they do not

  fundamentally affect Nokia’s culture (BBC News, 2011).

  Although this does go some way to addressing the key issues highlighted by this report, such

  as the need to reduce costs and coordination of R&D, I would argue Nokia is need of a

  revolution strategic change. Past strategic mistakes are inter-woven with Nokia’s highly

  bureaucratic, masculine and Finland National-based culture. For example, the sauna was

  where the majority of past business deals were finalised (Norman, 2011). Because of national

  pride Nokia has failed to admit its past mistakes and embrace change. Furthermore the

  changes do not indicate Nokia’s relative long-term strategy, they only answer immediate

  threats (Johnson, 2011).

  Elop has multiple styles of change management, each adapted to context. For example his

  initial involvement of employees when planning strategic priorities shows he is a

  participative leader, gaining support for future change. But his ‘burning platform’ memo

  reflects his aggressive (as reinforced by his previous nickname as ‘General’), yet honest and

  transparent leadership style (Hartley, 2011). Yet he can also be described as directive and

  coercive in his imposition of top-down change through the use of explicit power and clear

  17

  vision. Overall all his styles are appropriate to the transformational changes being introduced

  to Nokia today (Johnson et al, 2008; Goleman, 2000).

  Like others (Pooper, 2010), I still have reservations as to whether Elop will lead Nokia to the

  next-generation of Smartphones, especially due to his limited past experience and knowledge

  of Smartphones.

  18

  7. CONCLUSION

  The above analysis has indicated that Nokia is struggling within the high-velocity

  Smartphone market. Therefore I would not recommend a friend to invest into this company,

  until there were clear signs that the company was dealing with the key strategic issues

  highlighted by this report.

  However the above analysis is based upon limited data applicable to one SBU, it provides a

  business-level analysis not corporate-level. Furthermore there is the inherent difficulty of

  predicting the future correctly.

  19

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